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Industrial Real Estate Investment: Does the Contrarian Strategy Work? 
  
Abstract 
The superiority of the contrarian investment strategy, though well attested to in the finance literature, has 
received scant attention, if any, in the real estate literature. This study uses empirical industrial real estate 
investment return data from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3 for the US, and some Asia Pacific cities in order to 
ascertain the relative superiority of “value” and “growth” industrial real estate investments. The results 
show that “value” industrial property investment outperformed “growth” industrial property investment in 
all the holding periods under consideration. Furthermore the industrial property investments exhibit return 
reversal. This implies that the superiority of the contrarian strategy is sustainable. The results of stochastic 
dominance tests validate the relative superiority of “value” over “growth” industrial property investment. 
This implies that fund managers who traditionally have been favoring prime (i.e. growth) industrial 
property investment may have to reconsider their investment strategy if they want to maximize their return. 
 
Keywords: contrarian investment strategy, value-growth spread, value properties, growth properties, 
stochastic dominance, means reversion. 
 
Introduction 
The choice of an investment strategy is an important step in the decision-making process of fund managers 
and large institutional investors. In view of this, growth stock investment strategy and value stock 
investment strategy have received considerable attention in the finance literature. The growth stock 
investment strategy is frequently associated with investments in “glamour” stocks that have relatively high 
price-to-earnings ratios (i.e. high gross income multiplier in real estate terms1). On the other hand, value 
stock investment strategy usually involves investing in “gloomy” stocks that characteristically have 
relatively low market prices in relation to earnings per share (EPS),  cash flow per share,  book value per 
share, or  dividend per share (i.e. low gross income multiplier).  They are often less popular stocks that 
have recently experienced low or negative growth rates in corporate earnings. Notwithstanding their 
relative unpopularity with investors, studies have shown that investments in value stocks, commonly 
known as contrarian investment strategy, have outperformed growth stocks in major markets (see for 
example, Fama and French 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998; Capual et al. 1993; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Haugen 
1995; Arshanapali et al. 1998; Levis and Liodakis 2001; Badrinath and Omesh 2001; Chan and Lakonishok 
2004).  
 
However, Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of contrarian portfolios is a pre-WW II phenomenon 
that has since largely disappeared. Furthermore, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find that the Canadian 
stock market exhibits significant price inertia, which negates the relative superiority of contrarian 
investments. Similarly, Jedadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) and Grundy and Martin 
(2001) conclude that a momentum strategy (which contrasts with the contrarian strategy) is profitable.  
 
1 
                                                 
1 Boykin and Gray (1994) trace the historical development of GIM in real estate appraisal and relate GIM 
to the price/earnings ratio that is frequently used in stock valuation and serves as a benchmark in the value 
approach to investing. 
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These contrary findings have been refuted in the extant literature (see for example, Bauman and Miller 
1997). 
 
Given the significance of the contrarian hypothesis in the finance literature, it is surprising that the  
contrarian hypothesis hardly exists in the extant real estate literature. Thus, the first motivation of this study 
is to remedy this gap in the real estate literature. Secondly, the fact that the contrarian hypothesis is hardly 
found in the extant real estate literature could mean that real estate fund managers may be making sub-
optimal investment decisions, which then generate sub-optimal performances. Therefore the second 
motivation of this study is to provide evidence on contrarian real estate investment strategy to help fund 
managers make better informed real estate investment decisions and therefore improve the performance of 
their portfolios.  
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence in support of the superior performance of contrarian investment in 
the finance literature, there appears to be a prima facie case for expecting contrarian real estate investment 
to do likewise (Addae-Dapaah et al. 2002). Growth stock is analogous to prime properties, since both have 
relatively low earnings-to- price ratios (i.e. low initial yield) and investors in both investment media pin 
their hopes on a relatively high potential price or capital appreciation. Similarly, value stock, which 
provides high income, is comparable to high income-producing properties. In relation to real property, the 
contrarian strategy implies that value properties with high yields could outperform growth properties with 
low yields. Thus, the objectives of the study are: 
i) to ascertain the comparative advantage(s), in terms of performance, of contrarian real estate investment; 
ii) to evaluate the relative riskiness of value properties and growth properties;  
iii) to establish whether excessive extrapolation and expectational errors characterize growth and value 
strategies; and 
iv)  to ascertain the sustainability of the relative superiority (the “win”) of contrarian real estate investment 
if such superiority is established. 
 
In view of this, the next section provides a brief review of the finance literature on the contrarian 
investment strategy, after which a specific set of research hypotheses are formulated. This is followed by a 
discussion on data management and sourcing, and the contrarian strategy model. The next section is 
devoted to the empirical model estimation which is followed by a post-model estimation. The last section 
deals with concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review 
According to Dreman (1982) a contrarian investor is an investor who goes against the “grain”. Thus, 
contrarian investment strategy simply refers to investments which have lost favor with investors. It covers 
various investment strategies based on buying/selling that are priced low/high relative to accounting 
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measures of performance – earnings-to-price ratios (E/P), cash flow-to-price ratio (C/P) and book value-to-
price ratio (B/P) – as well strategies based on low/high measures of earning per share (EPS) growth 
(Capual 1993). In simple terms, the contrarian investment strategy refers to the value/growth stock 
paradigm. 
 
While there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the efficient market hypothesis that security prices 
provide unbiased estimates of the underlying values, many still question its validity. Smidt (1968) argues 
that one potential source of market inefficiency is inappropriate market responses to information. The 
inappropriate responses to information implicit in Price-Earnings (P/E) ratios may be indicators of future 
investment performance of a security. Proponents of this price-ratio hypothesis claim that low P/E stocks 
tend to outperform high P/E stocks (Williamson 1970). Basu (1977), Jaffe et al. (1989), Fama and French 
(1992, 1998), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Bauman et al. (1998), Badrinath and Omesh (2001) 
and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show a positive relationship between earnings yield and equity returns. 
However, as a result of the noisy nature of earnings (i.e. the category of stocks with low E/P also include 
stocks that have temporarily depressed earnings), value strategies based on E/P give narrower spreads 
compared to other simple value strategies (Chan and Lakonishok 2004). Furthermore, in view of the noise 
in reported earnings that results from Japanese accounting standards (i.e. distortions in the earnings induced 
by accelerated depreciation allowances), Chan et al. (1991) find no evidence of a strong positive earnings 
yield effect after controlling for the other fundamental variables.  
 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that stocks with high Book Value, relative to Market Value of equity 
(BV/MV), outperform the market. Further studies, e.g. Chan et al. (1991) and Fama and French (1992), 
confirm and extend these results. In view of the highly influential paper by Fama and French (1992), 
academics (e.g. Capaul et al. 1993; Davis 1994; Lakonishok et al. 1994; La Porta et al. 1997; Fama and 
French, 1998; Bauman et al. 1998, 2001; Chan et al. 2000; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004) have shifted their 
attention to the ratio of BV/MV as one of the leading explanatory variables for the cross-section of average 
stock returns.  
 
Although BV/MV has gained much credence as an indicator of value-growth orientation, it is by no means 
an ideal measure (Chan and Lakonishok 2004). BV/MV is not a ‘clean’ variable uniquely associated with 
economically interpretable characteristics of the firm (Lakonishok et al. 1994). Many different factors are 
reflected in this ratio. For an example, low BV/MV may describe a company with several intangible assets 
that are not reflected in accounting book value. A low BV/MV can also describe a company with attractive 
growth opportunities that do not enter the computation of book value, but do enter the market price. A 
stock whose risk is low and future cash flows are discounted at a low rate would have a low BV/MV as 
well. Finally, a low BV/MV may be reminiscent of an overvalued glamour stock.  
 
The shortcomings of accounting earnings have motivated a number of researchers to explore the 
relationship between cash flow yields and stock returns. High Cash Flow to Price (CF/P) stocks are 
identified as value stocks because their prices are low per dollar of cash flow, or the growth rate of their 
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cash flows is expected to be low. Chan et al. (1991), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Bauman et al. 
(1998), Fama and French (1998), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show that a high ratio of CF/P predicts 
higher returns. This is consistent with the idea that measuring the market’s expectations of future growth 
more directly gives rise to better value strategies (La Porta 1996).  
 
Fama and French (1998) and Bauman et al. (1998) use the ratio of Dividends to Price (D/P) as a proxy for 
the market’s expectations of future growth. Firms with higher ratios have lower expected growth and are 
considered to be value stocks. They show that the performance of the value stocks based on dividend yields 
is quantitatively similar to the performance based on the prior categorizations (i.e. P/E, BV/MV and CF/P). 
Finally, instead of using expectations of future growth to operationalize the notions of glamour and value, 
Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) use past growth to classify stocks. Davis (1994) and Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) measure past growth by Growth in Sales (GS) to conclude that the spread in abnormal returns 
is sizeable.  
 
To the extent that the different valuation indicators of value-growth orientation are not highly correlated, a 
strategy based on information from several valuation measures may enhance portfolio performance. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) explore sophisticated two-dimensional versions of simple value strategies. 
According to the two-way classification, value stocks are defined as those that have shown poor growth in 
sales, earnings and cash flow in the past, and are expected by the market to continue growing slowly. 
Expected performance is measured by multiples of price to current earnings and cash flow. La Porta et al. 
(1997) form portfolios on the basis of a two-way classification based on past GS and CF/P introduced by 
Lakonishok et al. (1994). Using robust regression methods, Chan and Lakonishok (2004) use cross-
sectional models to predict future yearly returns from beginning-year values of the BV/MV, CF/P, E/P and 
the sales to price ratio. The use of the multiple measures in the composite indicators boosts the performance 
of the value strategy (see Gregory et al. 2003).  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) controvert the above findings by showing that a momentum strategy (i.e. 
buying/selling past winners/losers) generates better returns. This conclusion has been concurred by 
Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) and Grundy and Martin (2001). Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of 
contrarian portfolios is a pre-WW II phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. However, this has 
been refuted by later studies which include post-war data.  Also, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) suggest 
that positive profits resulting from the use of the contrarian investment strategy are limited to the U.S. stock 
market. When applied to the Canadian stock market, the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) model does not 
produce favorable results. Instead of finding significant price reversals, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) 
find that the Canadian stock market exhibits significant price continuation behavior, which does not support 
contrarian investments. This is also refuted by later studies that include mean-reversion tendency (see for 
example, Bauman and Miller 1997). 
 
In view of the accumulated weight of the evidence from past studies, the finance academic fraternity agrees 
that value investment strategies, on average, outperform growth investment strategies. The only polemical 
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issue about the contrarian strategy is the rationale for its superior performance (see Gregory et al. 2003; 
Badrinath and Omesh 2001). 
 
Rationale for Superior Performance of Contrarian Strategies 
 Competing explanations include risk premiums (Fama and French 1993, 1995, 1996), systematic errors in 
investors’ expectations and analysts’ forecasts – i.e. naïve investor expectations of future growth and 
research design induced bias (see for example, La Porta et al. 1997; Bauman and Miller 1997; La Porta 
1996; Dechow and Sloan 1997; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Lo and MacKinlay 1990; Kothari et al. 1995) and 
the existence of market frictions (Amihud and Mendelson 1986) .The traditional view, led by Fama and 
French (1993, 1995, 1996), is that the superior performance is a function of contrarian investment being 
relatively risky (see also Chan 1988; Ball and Kothari 1989; Kothari and Shanken, 1992.). However, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), MacKinley (1995), La Porta et al. (1995, 1997), Daniel and Titman (1996) have 
found that risk-based explanations do not provide a credible rationale for the observed return behavior (see 
Jaffe et al. 1989; Chan et al. 1991; Chopra et al. 1992; Capaul et al. 1993; Dreman and Lufkin 1997; 
Bauman et al. 1998, 2001; Nam et al. 2001; Gomes et al. 2003; Gregory et al. 2003; Chan and Lakonishok 
2004).  
 
The behavioral finance paradigm recognizes psychological influences on human decision-making in which 
experts (in this case, investors) tend to focus on, and overuse, predictors of limited validity (i.e., earnings 
trend in the recent past) in making forecasts (see Covel and Shumway 2005). In view of systematic errors 
in investors’ expectations and analysts’ forecasts, it has been argued that a significant portion of value 
stocks’ superior performance is attributable to earning surprises (see De Bondt and Thaler 1985; 
Lakonishok et al. 1994; La Porta 1996; Chan et al. 2000, 2003; Chan and Lakonishok 2004; Jegadeesh et al. 
2004). According to Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and Liodakis (2001), positive and negative 
earnings surprises have an asymmetrical effect on the returns of value and growth stocks. Positive earning 
surprises have a disproportionately large positive impact on value stocks while negative surprises have a 
relatively benign effect on such stocks (see also Bauman and Miller 1997). 
 
Furthermore, analysts and institutional investors may have their own reasons for gravitating toward growth 
stocks. Analysts have self-interest in recommending successful stocks to generate trading commissions and 
more investment banking business. Moreover, growth stocks are typically in ‘promising’ industries, and are 
thus easier to promote in terms of analyst reports and media coverage (Bhushan 1989;  Jegadeesh et al. 
2004). These considerations play into the career concerns of institutional money managers (Lakonishok et 
al. 1994). Another important factor is that most investors have a shorter time horizon than is required for 
value strategies to consistently pay off (De Long et al. 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1990). In addition, 
institutional investors act in a fiduciary capacity. Pension fund trustees, in particular, are expected to 
behave as an “ordinary man of prudence”. This implies that they must go with the crowd (i.e. opt for 
glamour stocks. The result of all these considerations is that value stocks/glamour stocks become under-
priced/overpriced relative to their fundamentals. Due to the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), 
the mispricing patterns can persist over long periods of time.  
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A third hypothesis that has been postulated for the superiority of the contrarian value strategy is that the 
reported cross-sectional return differences is an artifact of the research design and the database used to 
conduct the study (Black 1993; Kothari et al. 1995). Thus, the abnormal returns would be reduced or vanish 
if a different methodology and data were used. Such researchers argue that the superior returns are the 
result of survivor biases in the selection of firms (Banz and Breen 1986), look-ahead bias (Banz and Breen 
1986), and a collective data-snooping exercise by many researchers sifting through the same data (Lo and 
MacKinlay 1990). Other problems include model specification (i.e. the appropriateness of parametric 
analysis and single factor capital asset pricing model) and misestimation of systematic risk (Mun et al. 
2001; Badrinath and Omesh 2001]). Finally, it is argued that the database is limited to a relatively short 
sample period (Davis 1994). The data-snooping explanation has been controverted by Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), Davis (1994, 1996), Fama and French (1998), Bauman and Conover (1999), Bauman et al. (2001), 
and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) who used databases that are free of survivorship bias and/or fresh data 
that previously have not been used for such analysis to confirm the superior performance of value strategy. 
Mun et al. (2001:635) refute the model specification criticism to conclude that the result of nonparametric 
analysis “is a distilled and pure Contrarian Strategy effect” – The parametric analysis confirms contrarian 
superiority although it provides a more conservative yield estimate of excess returns than nonparametric 
estimates. Similarly, Badrinath and Omesh (2001) conclude that misestimation of systematic risk cannot 
explain the abnormal profitability of the contrarian strategy (see Gregory et al. 2003). Thus, the superiority 
of the contrarian strategy is not a function of the mathematical/statistical models used for the analysis. 
 
Furthermore, two features of value investing distinguish it from other possible anomalies. According to 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004), many apparent violations of the efficient market hypothesis, such as day-of-
the-week patterns in stock returns, lack a convincing logical basis and the anomalous pattern is merely a 
statistical fluke that has been uncovered through data mining. The value premium, however, can be tied to 
ingrained patterns of investor behavior or the incentives of professional investment managers.  
 
In view of the analogy between value stock (high dividend yielding) and high income producing property 
(henceforth called value property2), the features of the contrarian investment strategy may apply to 
industrial property investment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
a) value industrial properties generate higher returns than growth industrial properties; 
b) value industrial property investment is riskier than growth industrial property investment; 
c) investors naively extrapolate past performance into future expectations; and 
d) the returns of value and growth industrial properties are mean-reverting. 
 
These hypotheses will be operationalized through statistical tests, and where possible, stochastic dominance 
test. 
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Data Sourcing and Management 
A growth real estate investor prefers properties with a low initial yield to properties with high initial yield. 
The investor chooses to exchange immediate cash flows for higher future cash flows (in the form of 
potential capital appreciation and/or rental growth) that are worth more at the date of the purchase, 
depending on the investor’s opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, a value property investor prefers 
to receive a high initial yield rather than to wait for future income or uncertain capital growth (see Marcato 
2004). This study uses data from the Property Council of New Zealand, the Property Council of Australia 
and NCREIF property databases3 to classify 52 (1, 3, and 48, respectively) industrial property sub-markets 
into value/growth sub-market cities on the bases of yields (see Appendix A-1), i.e. E/P ratio, which is 
analogous to the capitalization rate in appraisal and real estate investment.  
 
The data from the Property Council of New Zealand and the Property Council of Australia are based on 
market rentals and valuations. The quality of these data is attested by the fact that they have been subsumed 
by the IPD. All the datasets are extensively used by researchers. The only caveat about the use of different 
datasets is that one cannot guarantee that the quality of all the datasets is the same. However, the datasets 
are of very good quality to provide credible results. 
 
The other classification methods discussed in the literature review are not used to classify the data into 
value/growth properties because of the dearth of information on these accounting measures of 
classification. However, this is not a serious handicap as the finance literature shows that the results of 
studies based on these classification methods do not only confirm, but make  the research results based on 
the E/P classification more astounding (see Lakonishok et al. 1994; Chan and Lakonishok 2004]). 
Furthermore, Badrinath and Omesh (2001:387) state that “as a measure of value, strategies based on the 
E/P ratio are particularly popular in the investment community” and demonstrate the robustness of the 
abnormal profitability of the earnings’ yield (E/P)-based contrarian investment strategy. The data are from 
1985Q1 through 2005Q3. However, some of the submarkets do not have data over the entire period. For 
example, data for Indianapolis and San Francisco start from 1990Q4 and 1997Q1 respectively while data 
availability for Australia is from 1993Q2. Thus, markets are included in the analysis as, and when they 
become available. This explains why the portfolio composition (Appendix A-2) changes over time. 
 
The initial yields are measured in U.S. dollars. Decile portfolios are formed using one-way sorts on the 
basis of the end-of-previous-quarter’s initial yield. This is in consonance with the extant finance literature 
(see for example Badrinath and Omesh 2001; Gregory et al. 2003). The top decile of the sample with the 
highest initial yield (i.e. lowest GIM) is classified as value industrial property (Vp) portfolio, while the 
bottom decile with the lowest initial yield (i.e. highest GIM) is classified as growth industrial property (Gp).  
 
 
                                                 
2 Marcato (2004)uses the terms “value” and “growth” properties in his paper on creating style indexes in 
real estate markets. 
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3 
Each decile is treated as a portfolio composed of equally weighted properties (Chan et al. 1991; Lakonishok 
et al. 1994; Bauman et al. 1998, 2001). The portfolios are reformulated only at the end of each holding 
period.  
 
The classification of the industrial property sub-markets into Vp and Gp portfolios is followed by an 
examination of the relative performances of the portfolios. If there is evidence of a value premium, the 
underlying reasons for the relative superiority of Vp will be discussed.  
 
The Contrarian Strategy Model  
 
The performances of both the value and growth industrial properties are compared on a 5-year, 10-year, 15-
year and entire holding-period (of up to 83 quarters) horizons. Medium and long term investment horizons 
are the focus of analyses since real estate investors usually invest for the long term (Ball 1998). Periodic 
(i.e. quarter-by-quarter) return measures are used in the evaluation of the relative superiority of the 
performance of the Vp and Gp portfolios. The periodic returns are quantified as simple holding period 
returns. Thus, the simple holding period returns are calculated for each quarter and compounded to obtain 
the multi-year holding-period (e.g. 5-year investment horizon) returns as defined in equation (1). 
       11...11 21  mt rrrr  (Levy, 1999),    (1) 
Where: 
 r1, r2…rm = return for each quarter of the period m, and. 
 m             = number of quarters for the holding period.  
 
Compared to simply adding the returns for all quarters of a given period, equation (1) is more accurate 
(Sharpe et al. 1998). The periodic quartile returns for each holding- period horizon are averaged across the 
full period of study to determine the time-weighted average return. Arithmetic mean is most widely used in 
forecasts of future expectations and in portfolio analysis (Geltner and Miller 2001). Each value-growth 
spread (i.e. value premium) is then computed by subtracting the mean return for a Gp portfolio from that for 
the corresponding Vp portfolio. This is strictly in accordance with the procedure in the finance literature. 
Moreover, the median value premium is also reported. 
 
The pooled-variance t test and separate-variance t test are then used to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between the means of the Vp and Gp portfolios. If the p-value is smaller than the 
conventional levels of significance (i.e. 0.05 and 0.10), the null hypothesis that the two means are equal 
will be rejected: 
 growthvalueH  :0   
                                                 
3 The choice of cities (markets) used for the study is constrained by the datasets and therefore data 
availability. Other Asia Pacific cities are not included in the study simply because of want of data. 
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 growthvalueH  :1  
 
The next step is to determine whether any difference in returns is a function of variation in risk, using a 
more direct evaluation of the risk-based explanation that focuses on the performance of the value and 
growth properties in ‘bad’ states of the world. Traditional measures of risk, such as standard deviation of 
returns, risk-to-return ratio (i.e. coefficient of variation – CV) and return-to-risk ratio will be utilized.  
 
Levene’s Test is used to test the equality of the variances for the value and growth properties:  
 growthvalueH
22
0 :    
 growthvalueH
22
1 :    
 
 Performance in ‘Bad’ States of the World  
According to Lakonishok et al. (1994), value strategies would be fundamentally riskier than glamour 
strategies if:  
i) they under-perform glamour strategies in some states of the world; and  
ii) those are on average ‘bad’ states of the world, in which the marginal utility of wealth is high, making 
value strategies unattractive to risk-averse investors.  
 
Periods of severe stock market declines are used as a proxy for ‘bad’ states of the world. This is because 
they generally correspond to periods when aggregate wealth is low and thus the utility of an extra dollar is 
high. The approach of examining property performance during down markets also corresponds to the 
notion of downside risk that has gained popularity in the investment community (Chan and Lakonishok 
2004). If the above tests confirm the superiority of value properties, stochastic dominance will be used to 
ascertain the optimality of the value property investment strategy. 
 
Stochastic Dominance 
The most widely known and applied efficiency criterion for evaluating investments is the mean-variance model. 
Thus, some researchers (e.g. Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004; Petkova and Zhang 2005) have used the CAPM to 
examine the relative risk of value and growth stocks. While this may be appropriate for stocks, it is doubtful 
whether a mean-variance approach based on the assumptions of quadratic utility functions for investors and the 
normal distribution of investment returns is suitable for real property returns, which often are not normally 
distributed. An alternative approach, stochastic dominance (SD) analysis, which has been employed in various 
areas of economics, finance and statistics (Levy 1992; Al-Khazali 2002; Kjetsaa and Kieff 2003) may be more 
appropriate for property investment returns and is thus employed for this study. SD neither assumes normal 
probability distribution of returns nor quadratic utility functions (Kjetsaa and Kieff 2003). The efficacy and 
applicability of SD analysis, and its relative advantages over the mean-variance approach, have been discussed and 
proven by several researchers, including Hanoch and Levy (1969), Hadar and Russell (1969), Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970), Whitmore, 1970, Levy (1992), Al-khazali (2002) and Barrett and Donald (2003). According to 
Taylor and Yodder (1999), SD is a theoretically unimpeachable general model of portfolio choice that maximizes 
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expected utility. It uses the entire probability density function rather than simply summarizing a distribution’s 
features as given by its statistical moments. 
 
 
 
Stochastic Dominance Criteria 
The SD rules are normally specified as first, second, and third degree SD criteria denoted by FSD, SSD, and TSD 
respectively (see Levy 1992; Barrett and Donald 2003; Barucci 2003). There is also the nth degree SD. Given that 
F and G are the cumulative distribution functions of two mutually exclusive risky options X and Y, F dominates G 
(FDG) by FSD, SSD, and TSD, denoted by FD1G, FD2G, and FD3G, respectively, if and only if, 
    XGXF      for all X (FSD)   (2) 
      0  dttFtG
x
   for all X (SSD)    (3) 
      0   

dtdtFtG
x
  for all X, and 
     TSDXEXE GF          (4) 
The FSD (also referred to as the General Efficiency Criterion – Levy and Sarnat 1972) assumes that all investors 
prefer more wealth to less, regardless of their attitude towards risk. The SSD is based on the economic notion that 
investors are risk averse while the TSD posits that investors exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (Kjetsaa and 
Kieff 2003). A higher degree SD is required only if the preceding lower degree SD does not conclusively resolve 
the optimal choice problem. Thus, if FD1G, then for all values of x, F(x) ≤ G(x) or G(x) - F(x) ≥ 0. Since the 
expression cannot be negative, it follows that for all values of x, the following must also hold: 
      0  dttFtG
x
; that is, FD2G  (Levy and Sarnat 1972; Levy, 1998) 
 
Furthermore, the SD rules and the relevant class of preferences Ui are related in the following way: 
 
FSD: )()()()( XUEXUEXXGXF GF    1Uu ,  (5) 
SSD:      XUEXUEXdttGdttF GF
x x
  )(   2Uu , (6) 
TSD:        XUEXUEXdtdtGdtdtF GF
x xx
       

 
      3Uu , and 
         XEXE GF  ,   (7) 
Where: 
iU = utility function class (i =1, 2, 3) 
 1U  includes all u with 0'u ; 
 2U  includes all u with 0'u and 0'' u ; and 
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 3U  includes all u with 0'u , 0'' u  and 0''' u . 
In other words, a lower degree SD is embedded in a higher degree SD. The economic interpretation of the above 
rules for the family of all concave utility functions is that their fulfilment implies that  xUEF   xUEG  and 
 xEF    xEG ; i.e. the expected utility and return of the preferred option must be greater than the expected 
utility and return of the dominated option.  
 
Empirical Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
Following the evaluation of the risk characteristics of the Vp and Gp portfolios, the next task is to 
investigate the relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual future growth rates. This 
relationship is largely consistent with the predictions of the extrapolation model. The essence of 
extrapolation is that investors are excessively optimistic about growth properties and excessively 
pessimistic about value properties. A direct test of extrapolation (Lakonishok et al. 1994), then, is to look 
directly at the actual future rental income and capital growth rates of value and growth properties, and 
compare them to:  
 a)  past growth rates and  
 b)  expected growth rates as implied by the initial yields.  
 
If naïve extrapolation is established, the variance ratio test will be used to show that naïve extrapolation is a 
credible explanation to the relative superiority of the contrarian strategy. 
 
Variance Ratio Test 
The variance ratio, which measures the randomness of a return series, is calculated by dividing the variance 
of longer intervals’ returns by the variance of shorter intervals’ returns (for the same measurement period). 
The result is normalized to 1 by dividing it by the ratio of the longer to the shorter interval. The test 
assumes that if a return series follows a random walk, the variance of its k-differences should be k times the 
variance of its first difference (Poterba and Summers 1988). 
 
Assuming that yt denotes a time series consisting of T observations, the variance ratio of the k-th difference 
is calculated as follows (see Lo and MacKinlay 1988; Poterba and Summers 1988; Belaire-Franch and 
Oppong 2005): 
  
 
 
,
12
2

 k
kVR                                                                                          (8) 
Where: 
VR(k): is the variance ratio of the series k-th difference, 
 k2 : is the unbiased estimator of 1/k of the variance of the series k-th difference, 
 12 : is the variance of the first–differenced return series, and 
k: is the number of the days of the base observations interval, or the difference   interval. 
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The estimator of the k-period difference,  k2 , is computed as: 
 k2 =  
2
1
ˆ...
1


 
T
kt
ktt kyy
T
                                                          (9) 
Where: 



T
t
ty
T 1
1
ˆ ; while the unbiased estimator of variance of the first difference,  12 , is:  
 12 = 2
1
)ˆ(
1


T
t
ty
T
                                                                             (10) 
A variance ratio greater than 1 suggests that the shorter-interval returns trend within the duration of the 
longer interval (i.e. the return series is positively serially correlated). Conversely, a variance ratio less than 
1 implies that the return series is negatively serially correlated (i.e. the shorter-interval returns are mean 
reverting within the duration of the longer interval). 
 
 
Performance of the Contrarian Strategy  
 
Figures 1 to 4 clearly demonstrate the superiority of the contrarian strategy in each of the holding periods 
under consideration.  The value industrial property portfolio recorded 100% positive value-growth spread 
for all the investment formation horizons (Figures 1-4). In other words, the value industrial property 
portfolio outperformed its growth counterpart in every holding period. The mean value/growth industrial 
portfolio returns for the 5, 10, 15 and more than 15 years holding periods are 169.92%/40.62%, 
405.03%/105.46%, 1051.21%/184.75% and 1992.30%/258.69% respectively (Table 1a – full details are 
obtainable from authors). The corresponding median value/growth portfolio returns (see Table 1b) are 
139.52%/45.66%, 339.16%/89.80%, 1110.88/178.72% and 1720.27%/221.25. While the mean return 
overstates the contrarian superiority for the 5, 10 and more than 15-year holding periods, it understates the 
value superiority for the 15-year holding period. These figures imply that an investor who adopted the 
contrarian strategy over the more than 15-year holding period would have earned 1499.02% (based on 
median) or 1733.60% (based on mean) more on each dollar invested than the one who invested in glamour 
industrial properties over the same period (see Table 1a & 1b). 
 
 
  It is worth noting that the differences between the mean returns for both portfolios (i.e. the value 
premium) are statistically significant at both the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (Table 2a). 
 
Tables 2a & 2b 
 
The relative superiority of the industrial value portfolios is confirmed by the results of stochastic 
dominance test presented in Figures 5a, b, c, and d. 
Figures 5a-d 
Figures 5a, b, c, and d clearly demonstrates that VpD1Gp for all the holding periods under consideration – 
i.e. the value industrial portfolios are the most efficient (and therefore the optimal) choice. This implies that 
Figures 1-4 & Tables 1a & 1b 
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value industrial portfolios stochastically dominate growth portfolios in the first, second and third order. In 
other words, the value portfolios statistically presaged a higher probability of success than the growth 
portfolios. For example, there was almost 64% and 3% probability that the 5-year cumulative holding 
period return for the value and growth portfolios, respectively, was equal to, or greater than, 100% (Figure 
5a). Similarly, Figure 5b shows that there was almost 98% and 7% probability that the 10-year cumulative 
holding period return for the value and growth portfolios respectively was greater than or equal to 200%. 
The value-growth probability of success gap widened with increased duration of the holding period. Thus, 
value industrial portfolio investment should have been preferable to both risk averters and risk lovers 
(Kjetsaa and Kieff 2003; Levy and Sarnat 1972). 
 
Is the Superior Performance of the Contrarian Strategy Compensation for Higher Risk? 
 
According to the traditional school of thought (see literature review), the superiority of the contrarian 
strategy is a compensation for higher systematic risk (i.e. higher return is a reward for higher risk). If the 
value strategy is fundamentally riskier, it should under-perform the growth strategy during undesirable/bad 
states of the world – i.e. times of severe market decline when the marginal utility of consumption is high 
(Lakonishok et al. 1994). This section is therefore aimed at ascertaining if there is any correlation between 
“value” underperformance and “bad” states of the world. Furthermore, traditional measures of risk (i.e. 
standard deviation) and risk-adjusted performance indicators (i.e. coefficient of variation) are used to 
compare “value” and growth strategies.  
 
Figures 1-4 show that the value strategy virtually never under-performed the growth strategy in any holding 
period. Thus, there is no underperformance of the value portfolios to be associated with severe market 
declines as defined by some pay-off relevant factor.  
 
The performance of the value and growth properties in four states of the world (i.e. Worst, Next Worst, 
Next Best, and Best 20 quarters) based on Datastream Indices (a composite of REITs and publicly traded 
real estate stocks) for the Pacific Basin Real Estate Stock Market from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3 is presented in 
Figure 6. The choice of any real estate stock market for this analysis is controversial as there is no single 
market that mirrors the Asian and US markets. Furthermore, the study relates to industrial real estate, but it 
is hardly possible to get an industrial real estate stock market for the analysis. Moreover, although the 
Asian markets only make up four of the 52 markets under consideration, they feature prominently in almost 
every portfolio to justify the use of the Pacific Basin Real Estate Stock Market as a proxy for the analysis. 
It must be conceded that given the foregoing anecdotes, the use of this proxy (or any other alternative proxy 
such as the US REITS market) is an “inevitable” limitation which may bias the results for this section. This 
limitation is counterbalanced by the stochastic dominance test which is neutral to the market index. 
 
Furthermore, the prominence of the Pacific Rim markets in the value portfolios, in particular, could create 
the misconception that the results are more Pacific Rim strategy than contrarian.  
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Such a possible misconception is dispelled by the results of the US only data analyses presented in 
Appendix C4. The results are still contrarian when the Pacific Rim markets are excluded from the analyses, 
i.e. value statistically outperforms growth industrial property portfolio at both the 0.01 and 0.05 levels of 
significance. 
 
After matching the quarterly returns for the growth and value portfolios with the changes in the real estate 
stock market return, the mean value-growth spread in each state is reported together with the corresponding 
t-statistics for the test that the difference in returns is equal to zero (Table 3), i.e. 
  
0
0


growthvaluel
growthvalueo
:H
:H


 
  
Figure 6 & Table 3 
 
Table 3 shows that the value strategy did notably better than the growth strategy in all 4 states of the world.  
The null hypothesis is therefore rejected for all 4 states of the world to conclude that there is statistical 
difference between the means of the two populations. It is evident from Table 3 that the superior 
performance of the value strategy was skewed towards negative market return months rather than positive 
market return months. The evidence indicates that there are no significant traces of a conventional asset 
pricing equilibrium in which the higher returns on the value strategy are compensation for higher 
systematic risk.  
 
The volatility of the portfolios’ returns during the period of study is presented in Table 1a. The results show 
that value portfolios recorded a higher standard deviation of returns than growth portfolios for all the 
holding periods.  The results presented in Table 2b indicate that the value industrial property portfolio 
standard deviations are higher and significantly different, at the 0.01 level, from those of the growth 
industrial properties. However, since the mean returns and variances of the two portfolios are different, the 
coefficient of variation (CV) is a more appropriate risk measure for comparison. The CVs in Table 1a 
imply that the value industrial portfolios were safer than the growth industrial portfolios for all the holding 
periods, except the more than 15-year holding period. However, since value industrial property portfolios 
stochastically dominate growth industrial property portfolios in all the holding periods (Figure 5), the latter 
is riskier than the former (Biswas, 1997). Hence, a risk model based on differences in standard deviation 
alone may not be a credible explanation for the superior performance of value properties.  
 
Post-Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
This part of the study provides empirical evidence to verify whether excessive extrapolation and  
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expectational errors characterize growth and value strategies. First, the study period is divided into two:  
past (pre-portfolio formation) and future (post-formation) performances (see Panels B and C respectively of 
Table 4). Table 4 presents some descriptive characteristics for the growth and value portfolios with respect 
to their initial yields, past growth rates, and future growth rates. Panel A of Table 4 reveals that the value 
portfolios had higher initial yields than growth portfolios. This is supposed to signify lower expected 
growth rates for value properties. Panel B shows that, using several measures of past growth, including 
rental income and capital value, the growth portfolio performance grew faster than the value portfolios over 
the pre- portfolio formulation period. Panel C shows that over the subsequent post-formulation years, the 
relative growth of rental income and capital value for growth properties was generally quite below 
expectations.  
 
It must be noted that the figures in Panels B and C represent the incremental growth in performances 
between the returns for the preceding and successive quarters’ portfolios, since the analysis is based on the 
assumption that portfolios are reformulated at the beginning of each quarter. Thus, the 401.62% capital 
growth for the value portfolio in 2001Q2 reflects the growth in the performance of the 2001Q2 portfolio, 
relative to that of the 2001Q1 portfolio. These assumptions, which are in consonance with the finance 
literature, are merely to test the plausibility of naïve extrapolation being a credible explanation for the value 
superiority. They certainly are not intended in any way to imply/suggest that real estate investors do/should 
reformulate their portfolio quarterly. 
Table 4 
 
Recall that the Gordon’s formula (Gordon and Shapiro (1956)) can be rewritten as 
dgR
P
I
k pNp 





  , where pk  is the initial yield for property, I is the current rental income, P 
is the market price, NR  is the required nominal return, and ( dg p  ) is the rental growth for actual, 
depreciating properties. These formulae literally imply that, holding discount rates constant, the differences 
in expected rental growth rates can be directly calculated from differences in initial yields. Since the 
assumptions behind these simple formulae are restrictive (e.g. constant growth rates, etc.), this study does 
not calculate exact estimates of the differences in expected rental growth rates between value and growth 
portfolios. Instead, we are trying to ascertain whether the large differences in initial yields between value 
and growth properties can be justified by the differences in future rental growth rates.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 reveals that the average quarterly incremental portfolio growth rate for rental income for 
the growth industrial property portfolio was 20.43% compared to -1.47% for the value industrial property 
portfolio over the pre-portfolio formation period.  
                                                 
4 The results are presented in the appendix as a regional analysis of the topic is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We are currently working on a forthcoming paper, “Contrarian Real Estate Investment: A Regional 
Analysis” (to be submitted to JREFE) which deals with the topic on both regional and property type bases. 
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Every dollar invested in the value portfolio in 1994Q3 had a claim to  5.16 cents of the then existing 
corresponding rental income, while a dollar invested in the growth portfolio was a claim to 2.05 cents of 
the rental income (Panel A of Table 4). Ignoring any difference in required rates of return, the large 
differences in initial yields have to be justified by an expectation of higher incremental rental growth rates 
for growth than value portfolios over a period of time. Thus, the expected rental income for the growth 
portfolio must be higher than the value portfolio at some future date. In view of this, investors might like to 
know the number of quarters it would take for the rental income per dollar invested in the growth portfolios 
(0.0205) to equate to the rental income of the value portfolio (0.0516), assuming that the differences in past 
incremental rental income growth rates would persist. It would take approximately five quarters for such 
equalization to occur (see Table 5). This is good news for naïve extrapolators who can foresee their 
glamour investments catching up and far outperforming value investments after only five quarters. Note 
that this equality is based on a flow basis. It would require a longer time period over which growth 
properties should experience superior growth to affect this equality if the analysis is on a present value 
basis. 
Table 5 
 
Unfortunately, a comparison of Panels B and C (Table 4) show that the relatively higher expected 
incremental future growth (implied by the higher incremental growth rate in the pre-formation period) for 
the glamour portfolios during the post-formation period was a far cry from reality. The actual post-
formation incremental rental growth rate for glamour industrial property portfolios plummeted by 91.39% 
from 20.43% to 1.76% per quarter. Alternatively, the post-formation incremental rental growth rate for the 
value industrial property portfolios increased by 197.28% from -1.47% to 1.43%. These results are 
consistent with the extrapolation model. Contrarian(value)/growth investors were pleasantly/unpleasantly 
surprised by the post formation portfolio results. Rental is, however, a portion of portfolio performance. 
Capital value is an important portion of a portfolios performance and thus, must be analyzed in relation to 
the extrapolation model.  
 
During the pre-formation period, the incremental capital value growth rate for the glamour industrial 
portfolio of -1.21% was higher than that for value industrial portfolio of -7.45% (Table 4). The results in 
Table 4 (Panels B and C) reveal that while the  incremental capital value growth rate for the growth 
industrial portfolio increased by 108.26% from -1.21% to 0.10%, that for the value industrial portfolio also 
increased by 165.5% from -7.45% to 4.88% per quarter during the post-formation period. Once again, the 
results are consistent with the extrapolation model. 
 
The pertinent question that needs to be addressed at this juncture is whether, given the post-formation 
performance of increased capital value growth rates for the growth and value industrial portfolios, the 
growth portfolio can outperform the value portfolio at some time in the future. This is addressed via a mean 
reversion analysis. 
 
Variance Ratio Test 
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The results of the variance ratio tests are presented in Table 6. The returns for both the growth and value 
portfolios display mean reversion in all the holding periods under consideration.  These results imply that 
the superior performance of the contrarian value strategy is not a flash in the pan – and that it will persist in 
future years. 
 
   
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This study set out to investigate the comparative advantage(s) of the value and growth investment strategies 
to ascertain the sustainability of the superior performance (if any) of the contrarian (value) strategy for 
industrial property. The results indicate that the value industrial property portfolios out-performed (in both 
absolute, and in most cases, risk-adjusted bases) the growth industrial property portfolios over all the 
holding periods under consideration. A dollar invested in the value industrial property portfolio over 10 
years earned 299.57% (based on mean return) or 249.38% (based on median return) more than a dollar 
invested in the growth industrial property portfolios. Similarly, a dollar invested in the value industrial 
property portfolios over the entire period of study earned 1733.60% (based on mean return) or 1499.01% 
(based on median return) more than a similar investment in the growth industrial property portfolios.  The 
difference between the performances of the value and the growth portfolios are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean returns for the two 
portfolios is rejected.  It must be cautioned though that the analyses did not account for management 
considerations and trading costs. However, it is doubtful whether these considerations could materially 
change the results. 
 
Furthermore, the superior performances of value portfolios occurred in all the four “states of the world”. 
The superior performance is not a compensation for higher risk as measured by the coefficient of variation 
(CV) for investment horizons of up 15 years. These findings are consistent with the contrarian strategy in 
finance. It must be noted, however, that the superior performance of the contrarian (value) strategy for 
investment horizons of more than 15 years could be a compensation for higher risk, as measured by the 
CV. Notwithstanding this caveat, the relative superiority of the value portfolio for each holding period is 
confirmed by stochastic dominance tests, which indicate that the value strategy is the optimal choice for 
both risk averters and risk lovers. In addition, the variance ratio test reveals that returns for both value and 
growth portfolios exhibit mean reversion at medium and long investment horizons. This means that the 
superior performance of the contrarian strategy is sustainable. The consistency of the results with the 
finance literature cannot be attributed to data snooping, as the studies in the finance literature are based on 
different data. 
 
Notwithstanding the consistency of the above results with the finance literature, one should note the 
significant differences between the studies in finance (based on stocks) and this study which is based on 
real property. Apart from the difference in liquidity of assets, studies in the finance literature are based on 
Table 6 
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prices while this study is based on valuation estimates (capital values) and market rentals. Furthermore, 
while the studies in finance are based on prices of individual stocks, this study is based on sub-market 
averages. Although one may argue about the validity of results based on averages, the fact that the results 
are consistent with the finance literature may imply that it may not be prudent for one to tersely 
underestimate the validity of the results. After all, all studies that are based on market indices are based on 
average market figures. More research is, however, needed before any firm conclusion can be made. 
 
The findings imply that high initial yield industrial property portfolios in the sample outperformed their low 
yield counterparts during the period under investigation. The fact that value investment provides a 
statistically significant abnormal value premium, vis-à-vis the fact that the price of a growth property could, 
perhaps, buy two or more value properties implies that it may be doubly advantageous to invest in value 
properties. If the results can be generalized in any way, one may safely conclude that industrial property 
investors should seriously consider the contrarian (value) real estate investment strategy to improve the 
performance of their portfolios. 
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Table 1b: Median versus Mean Returns 
 
Holding Period 
Cumulative Median Return (%) Cumulative Mean Return (%) 
Value (V) Growth (G) V-G Spread Value (V) Growth (G) V-G Spread 
5 Years 
10 Years 
15 Years 
>15 Years 
139.52 
339.16 
1110.88 
1720.27 
45.66 
89.90 
178.72 
221.25 
93.86 
249.36 
932.16 
1499.02 
169.92 
405.03 
1051.21 
1992.29 
40.26 
105.46 
184.75 
258.69 
129.66 
299.57 
866.46 
1733.60 
 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive Return Statistics 
 
Holding Period 
Mean Return (%) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Value Growth Value Growth Value Growth 
       
5 Years 169.92 40.26 129.40 34.34 0.76 0.85 
10 Years 405.03 105.46 186.90 58.90 0.46 0.56 
15 Years 1051.21 184.75 232.23 51.40 0.22 0.28 
> 15 Years 1992.29 258.69 964.00 88.99 0.48 0.34 
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Table 2a: Equality of Means Test 
Holding Period Value-Growth Spread 
(%) 
t-test Test statistic t p-value   
5 Years 129.66 
Pooled-variance 7.75 0.000 Reject Reject 
Separate-variance 7.75 0.000 Reject Reject 
10 Years 299.57 
Pooled-variance 10.14 0.000 Reject Reject 
Separate-variance 10.14 0.000 Reject Reject 
15 Years 866.46 
Pooled-variance 17.85 0.000 Reject Reject 
Separate-variance 17.85 0.000 Reject Reject 
> 15 Years 1733.60 
Pooled-variance 8.21 0.000 Reject Reject 
Separate-variance 8.21 0.000 Reject Reject 
Table 2b: Equality of Variance Test 
Holding Period 
Standard Deviation 
F-test statistics p-value  
Value Growth 
       
Quarterly 5.27 2.29 5.30 0.000 Reject Reject 
5 Years 129.40 34.34 64.89 0.000 Reject Reject 
10 Years 186.90 58.90 22.64 0.000 Reject Reject 
15 Years 232.23 51.40 28.11 0.000 Reject Reject 
> 15 Years 964.00 88.99 56.01 0.000 Reject Reject 
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Table 3: Performance of Portfolios in Different States of the World 
States of the 
World 
 
Mean value 
 
Mean Growth 
 
Mean Spread 
Tests for equality of Means 
t-test Test statistic t p-value 
Worst period 4.41 -0.23 4.64 
Pooled-variance 4.31 0.000 Reject 
Separate-variance 4.31 0.000 Reject 
Next worst 
Period 5.69 -0.32 6.01 
Pooled-variance 4.55 0.000 Reject 
Separate-variance 4.55 0.000 Reject 
Next best 
Period 6.17 2.14 4.04 
Pooled-variance 4.84 0.000 Reject 
Separate-variance 4.84 0.000 Reject 
Best Period 8.05 2.33 5.72 
Pooled-variance 3.68 0.000 Reject 
Separate-variance 3.68 0.001 Reject 
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Table 4: Initial Yields, Past and Future Performances of Value and Growth 
Properties Industrial Properties 
 
  
Panel B: Past Performances of Industrial Properties  
 Value Growth 
Year 
Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 
Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 
1985Q1 3.49 -10.04 0.33 28.09 
1985Q2 9.78 -2.77 -0.30 17.08 
1985Q3 10.42 -10.74 1.11 53.13 
1985Q4 8.07 -13.11 2.33 75.05 
1986Q1 14.48 34.09 -0.10 1.96 
1986Q2 8.26 14.43 4.34 133.92 
1986Q3 7.47 -13.38 -3.22 57.14 
1986Q4 -2.62 -8.56 -2.13 25.23 
1987Q1 -3.56 -0.41 -1.16 25.14 
1987Q2 5.50 3.74 -1.80 12.58 
1987Q3 4.99 -1.61 -1.68 -2.32 
1987Q4 19.25 -6.02 -5.43 -2.21 
1988Q1 9.96 -12.62 -0.30 10.18 
1988Q2 2.03 -28.59 0.55 2.81 
1988Q3 3.50 -10.86 -0.31 14.89 
1988Q4 0.71 -13.76 -1.30 10.39 
1989Q1 -4.77 -14.75 0.07 44.75 
1989Q2 -7.09 -9.42 0.01 6.44 
1989Q3 -7.01 -2.32 0.23 -9.88 
1989Q4 -15.02 -8.35 -1.73 85.05 
1990Q1 -23.97 -3.15 -4.31 -0.15 
1990Q2 -79.20 -17.69 -0.23 0.91 
1990Q3 -81.46 39.75 -2.43 46.27 
1990Q4 19.05 26.34 -4.04 15.10 
1991Q1 13.41 21.41 -1.19 49.70 
1991Q2 6.68 -9.09 -2.47 1.62 
1991Q3 8.19 9.93 -2.51 6.49 
1991Q4 -5.01 7.03 -7.32 43.55 
1992Q1 -6.58 1.42 -0.89 4.04 
1992Q2 -10.22 0.80 -3.10 20.29 
1992Q3 -17.40 -16.83 -2.54 -0.33 
1992Q4 5.87 2.57 -4.30 20.04 
1993Q1 1.43 16.89 -3.06 6.91 
1993Q2 -5.41 -1.78 -2.42 -0.14 
1993Q3 -5.58 -18.94 -2.46 7.45 
1993Q4 -19.91 -1.10 -3.14 33.85 
 
Panel A: Initial Yields   
  Value Growth 
1994 Q3 Initial Yield 5.16 2.05 
1994 Q4 
Portfolio 
Composition 
Ford Lauderdale Memphis 
Orlando Sydney 
Tampa Brisbane 
 AuckLand 
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Panel B Continued: 
Panel B: Past Performances of Industrial Properties 
 Value Growth 
Year 
Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 
Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 
1994Q1 -45.04 -8.95 -2.73 20.38 
1994Q2 73.58 50.95 8.40 8.40 
1994Q3 19.71 1.65 2.02 15.55 
1994Q4 -6.31 3.17 2.06 32.13 
Geometric Average 
Growth Rate 
-7.45 -1.47 -1.21 20.43 
 
Panel C: Future Performances of Industrial Properties 
  Value Growth 
Year Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 
Capital Growth 
(%) 
Rental Growth 
(%) 1995Q1 -9.86 12.95 1.30 6.14 
1995Q2 3.55 1.24 1.16 -15.97 
1995Q3 -2.22 10.48 -0.04 -14.62 
1995Q4 0.49 -1.63 -0.72 35.19 
1996Q1 3.43 6.28 2.83 49.37 
1996Q2 -0.68 -1.06 0.36 -7.04 
1996Q3 -3.21 -0.52 0.55 -11.06 
1996Q4 11.81 5.63 0.56 35.99 
1997Q1 -1.85 0.48 2.57 8.30 
1997Q2 -1.07 -0.81 0.78 -10.67 
1997Q3 9.08 1.93 1.59 4.66 
1997Q4 1.92 -10.39 2.17 -5.20 
1998Q1 -5.03 15.17 0.57 2.19 
1998Q2 -1.20 -4.76 4.46 -4.61 
1998Q3 -17.24 4.44 1.97 -22.83 
1998Q4 -9.80 2.70 0.26 -17.75 
1999Q1 -12.91 8.69 0.38 -5.93 
1999Q2 15.41 0.36 1.01 0.30 
1999Q3 7.36 -1.30 0.80 -8.00 
1999Q4 -8.96 5.52 2.19 21.93 
2000Q1 -23.09 -1.66 1.29 1.93 
2000Q2 -18.13 2.17 1.10 6.85 
2000Q3 -109.70 3.38 0.14 -19.98 
2000Q4 -51.56 1.09 0.27 19.42 
2001Q1 -167.77 2.84 1.02 14.03 
2001Q2 401.62 0.71 0.78 6.18 
2001Q3 23.38 0.94 1.34 7.47 
2001Q4 22.95 -4.79 -0.58 72.33 
2002Q1 -21.36 -0.31 -0.63 -2.24 
2002Q2 22.64 0.25 -0.29 -4.13 
2002Q3 60.71 -4.14 0.84 -10.59 
2002Q4 -1.06 8.12 0.40 -6.92 
2003Q1 37.16 -0.14 -9.98 23.37 
2003Q2 -0.20 -4.44 -0.18 -0.63 
2003Q3 12.40 -1.43 -5.64 -21.03 
2003Q4 6.83 2.50 -1.56 -3.94 
2004Q1 -6.19 -4.01 -11.51 13.44 
2004Q2 -0.26 2.82 2.71 5.39 
2004 Q3 30.22 1.22 1.56 -10.12 
Geometric Average 
Growth Rate 
4.88 1.43 0.10 1.76 
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Table 5: Growth of Industrial Sector’s Rental Income Per Dollar Invested (4th Quarter 1994)  
Quarters Value Portfolio Growth Portfolio Quarters Value Portfolio Growth Portfolio 
0 5.16 2.05 4 4.86 4.31 
1 5.08 2.47 5 4.78 5.19 
2 5.01 2.97  
3 4.94 3.58    
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Variance Ratio Test 
 
 Investment Horizon 
Variance Ratio 
 
 Value Portfolio Growth Portfolio 
 4 Quarters 5.896 
 
0.712 
 
20 Quarters 0.298 
 
0.712 
 
40 Quarters 0.523 
 
0.659 
 
60 Quarters 0.254 
 
0.479 
 
80 Quarters 0.050 
 
0.354 
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Appendix A-1: Cities in the Portfolios 
 
Code Country Code Country 
1 Atlanta 27 Oklahoma City 
2 Austin 28 Orlando 
3 Baltimore 29 Oxnard 
4 Boston 30 Philadelphia 
5 Cambridge 31 Phoenix 
6 Camden 32 Portland 
7 Charlotte 33 Reno 
8 Chicago 34 Riverside 
9 Cincinnati 35 Sacramento 
10 Columbus 36 St. Louis 
11 Dallas 37 Salt Lake City 
12 Denver 38 San Diego 
13 Edison 39 San Francisco 
14 Fort Lauderdale 40 San Jose 
15 Fort Worth 41 Santa Ana 
16 Houston 42 Seattle 
17 Indianapolis 43 Tacoma 
18 Kansas City 44 Tampa 
19 Lake County 45 Warren 
20 Los Angeles 46 Washington 
21 Louisville 47 Wilmington 
22 Memphis 48 Worcester 
23 Miami 49 Sydney 
24 Minneapolis 50 Melbourne 
25 New York 51 Brisbane 
26 Oakland 52 Auckland(nz) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
Appendix A-2: Composition of Value and Growth Portfolios 
  Year Country Code Year Country Code 
 
Growth 
Properties 
Value 
Properties 
 
Growth 
Properties 
Value 
Properties 
1985Q1 16 3 1995Q3 12,15,44 22,31,52 
1985Q2 16,40 15,49 1995Q4 13,14,34 10,22,52 
1985Q3 3,36 22,49 1996Q1 3,44,51 2,42,52 
1985Q4 3,31 22,49 1996Q2 2,12,46 40,44,52 
1986Q1 16,31 46,49 1996Q3 3,14,23 6,25,52 
1986Q2 3,31 15,49 1996Q4 14,17,23 32,50,52 
1986Q3 16,36 3,49 1997Q1 10,15,34,35 17,32,46,52 
1986Q4 16,28 22,49 1997Q2 14,17,20,35 16,24,44,52 
1987Q1 16,28 22,49 1997Q3 3,14,34,35 2,17,49,52 
1987Q2 16,31 22,49 1997Q4 3,17,26,34 24,37,50,52 
1987Q3 26,40 22,49 1998Q1 3,14,28,34 16,25,50,52 
1987Q4 16,40 22,49 1998Q2 17,26,40,42 12,25,50,52 
1988Q1 6,16 3,49 1998Q3 3,13,17,26 14,16,28,52 
1988Q2 6,16 15,49 1998Q4 3,26,40,44 8,9,27,52 
1988Q3 6,16 22,49 1999Q1 10.17,26,37 18,25,27,52 
1988Q4 16,28 3,49 1999Q2 12,14,26,37 27,33,51,52 
1989Q1 6,16 1,49 1999Q3 10,26,40,44 9,25,30,52 
1989Q2 16,34 22,49 1999Q4 14,26,34,44 5,30,35,52 
1989Q3 15,31 9,49 2000Q1 1,17,26,35 5,9,13,52 
1989Q4 15,28 8,49 2000Q2 14,17,29,48 6,15,24,52 
1990Q1 9,28 44,49 2000Q3 13,17,31,48 9,40,44,52 
1990Q2 6,31 16,49 2000Q4 13,14,29,31 18,27,35,52 
1990Q3 10,28 22,49 2001Q1 13,17,25,33 7,15,27,51 
1990Q4 1,10 17,49 2001Q2 5,13,25,39,42 2,15,30,33,51 
1991Q1 20,46 15,49 2001Q3 13,25,27,33,44 2,3,16,29,30 
1991Q2 10,20,44 4,22,49 2001Q4 1,13,14,39,44 6,29,33,51,52 
1991Q3 9,20,46 16,36,49 2002Q1 15,16,25,33,39 2,30,36,44,52 
1991Q4 4,17,44 22,42,49 2002Q2 8,23,25,33,39 30,36,45,48,50 
1992Q1 4,34,35 20,44,49 2002Q3 6,13,25,33,39 24,29,36,45,48 
1992Q2 4,22,35 13,14,49 2002Q4 13,14,25,43,44 2,12,18,29,52 
1992Q3 4,35,41 13,16,49 2003Q1 12,14,16,27,33 2,37,45,50,51 
1992Q4 4,28,35 22,44,49 2003Q2 10,12,16,33,38 30,43,45,50,52 
1993Q1 13,35 22,28,49 2003Q3 23,33,36,38,43 7,10,26,30,45 
1993Q2 17,34,35 22,49,52 2003Q4 6,27,33,35,44 19,23,30,45,52 
1993Q3 4,35,41 22,49,52 2004Q1 6,23,35,36,44 10,26,30,45,52 
1993Q4 22,28,35 44,49,52 2004Q2 5,14,23,41,43 10,30,33,45,52 
1994Q1 4,6,35 44,49,52 2004Q3 6,14,23,36,47 10,30,45,51,52 
1994Q2 3,4,35 49,51,52 2004Q4 4,14,23,28,50 2,30,33,51,52 
1994Q3 8,14,35 49,51,52 2005Q1 5,6,23,47 44,45,46,52 
1994Q4 14,28,44 49,51,52 2005Q2 5,15,30,35 10,18,,27,44 
1995Q1 14,28,46 49,51,52 2005Q3 5,25,30,40 21,22,37,52 
1995Q2 6,14,46 49,51,52     
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Appendix B: States of the World 
 
Year State Year State Year State Year State 
1985Q1 W 1990Q2 W 1995Q3 NB 2000Q4 NB 
1985Q2 W 1990Q3 NW 1995Q4 B 2001Q1 NB 
1985Q3 W 1990Q4 W 1996Q1 B 2001Q2 NB 
1985Q4 W 1991Q1 W 1996Q2 B 2001Q3 NB 
1986Q1 W 1991Q2 W 1996Q3 B 2001Q4 NW 
1986Q2 W 1991Q3 W 1996Q4 B 2002Q1 NB 
1986Q3 W 1991Q4 NW 1997Q1 B 2002Q2 NB 
1986Q4 W 1992Q1 NW 1997Q2 B 2002Q3 NB 
1987Q1 W 1992Q2 W 1997Q3 B 2002Q4 NW 
1987Q2 NW 1992Q3 W 1997Q4 B 2003Q1 NW 
1987Q3 NW 1992Q4 W 1998Q1 NB 2003Q2 NW 
1987Q4 NW 1993Q1 W 1998Q2 NB 2003Q3 NW 
1988Q1 W 1993Q2 NW 1998Q3 NW 2003Q4 NB 
1988Q2 NW 1993Q3 NW 1998Q4 W 2004Q1 B 
1988Q3 Worst 1993Q4 NB 1999Q1 NB 2004Q2 B 
1988Q4 NW 1994Q1 B 1999Q2 NB 2004Q3 B 
1989Q1 NW 1994Q2 NB 1999Q3 B 2004Q4 B 
1989Q2 NW 1994Q3 NB 1999Q4 NB 2005Q1 B 
1989Q3 NW 1994Q4 B 2000Q1 B 2005Q2 B 
1989Q4 NW 1995Q1 NB 2000Q2 NB 2005Q3 B 
1990Q1 NW 1995Q2 NB 2000Q3     NB   
W=Worst , NW=Next Worst , NB= Next Best , B=Best 
 39 
 
 
 
   100% positive Value-Growth spread. 
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    100% positive Value-Growth spread. 
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   100% positive Value-Growth spread. 
   Note: The value-growth spread increases with the length of the holding period. 
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Appendix C2a: Descriptive Return Statistics 
  
Holding Period 
Mean Return 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Value Growth Value Growth Value Growth 
    
 
        
5 Years 71.26 27.22 28.14 31 0.39 1.14 
10 Years 189.77 60.7 45.88 50.8 0.24 0.83 
15 Years 379.12 86.39 31.62 15.12 0.08 0.17 
Value is safer than growth in all periods as measured by CV and even as measured by standard deviation apart from 15-year holding period. 
 
 
 
Appendix C2b: Median versus Mean Return 
 
Holding Period 
Cumulative Median Return (%) Cumulative Mean Return (%) 
Value (V) Growth (G) V-G Spread Value (V) Growth (G) V-G Spread 
 
5 Years 
10 Years 
15 Years 
 
 
73.85 
169.09 
376.34 
 
 
26.79 
42.67 
86.40 
 
 
47.06 
126.42 
289.94 
 
 
71.26 
189.77 
379.12 
 
 
27.22 
60.70 
86.39 
 
 
44.04 
129.07 
292.73 
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Appendix C3a – FSD: 5-Year Holding Period     Appendix C3c –  FSD: 15-Year Holding Period 
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Appendix C3b – FSD: 10-Year Holding Period 
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Appendix C4: Test for Equality of Means for U.S. Portfolios 
Sector Holding Period Value-Growth t-test 
t-
value 
p-
value 
α = 
0.01 
α = 
0.05 
Industrial     separate variance 7.22 0.000 reject reject 
5 years 44.04% pooled variance 10.90 0.000 reject reject 
    separate variance 10.90 0.000 reject reject 
10 years 129.07% pooled variance 15.46 0.000 reject reject 
    separate variance 15.46 0.000 reject reject 
15 years 292.73% pooled variance 44.38 0.000 reject reject 
    separate variance 44.38 0.000 reject reject 
         
The null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the means of the two portfolios is rejected at both the 0.01 and 0.05 levels of 
significance. In other words, the superior performance of value over growth US industrial property portfolio is statistically significant. 
 
